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 This paper provides a first look at the dynamics of social assistance use among lone mothers
in Ontario. We use an administrative caseload data set to analyse the relationship between the
duration of spells, both on welfare and off welfare, and a series of factors including the clients’
personal characteristics, their history of welfare use, the duration of current spells, labour market
conditions and social assistance benefit levels. 
We find mixed evidence concerning the key policy question of the scarring or stigmatizing
effects of welfare, that is, a “welfare trap”.   There is evidence that the likelihood of exiting welfare
declines during the first year of a spell.  The support is weakest, however, in our preferred
specification.  There is more consistent evidence that the likelihood of returning to welfare declines
during the first year after an exit, that is, staying off the rolls has the beneficial effect of making
recidivism less likely.  Clients who have spent more months on welfare in the past (controlling for
age) do appear to have somewhat longer future spells on welfare and to return more quickly to the
rolls once they leave, but the magnitude of this effect is very small.  The length of both welfare and
off-welfare spells is very sensitive to the levels of welfare benefits. 
Most of the other coefficients have significant effects of the expected sign.  Welfare spells
tend to be longer for those lone mothers who are younger, poorly educated, never married, not
employable and for those who have more and younger children.  Spell lengths also increase with the
level of the unemployment rate and decrease with the level of the minimum wage.  Off-welfare spells
tend to be shorter (the return to welfare more rapid) for those lone mothers who are older, never
married, not employable and who have very young children.  Off-welfare spells are longer when the
minimum wage is higher.I.  Introduction
This paper provides one of the first in-depth looks at the dynamics of social assistance use
in Ontario.  Specifically, we study the duration of both welfare spells and off-welfare spells among
lone mothers during the first half of the 1990's.  This subject is timely for at least two reasons.  First,
social assistance (henceforth SA) policy reform has been high on the agenda in Ontario and in other
provinces.  This concern reflects in part the rapid growth in the welfare expenditures during the
1990's, but it has earlier roots in the recovery of the 1980's when there was no decline in the welfare
caseload despite a large drop in unemployment.  A second reason arises from our focus on lone
mothers.  Such families contain a large and growing fraction of poor children whose problems have
been the subject of  much recent discussion.  They are the most reliant on welfare of any family type
except for the disabled.  Yet relatively little is known about their patterns of social assistance use
especially in Ontario.
Several studies have used data from a single cross-section or a time-series of cross-sections
to study the welfare participation of Canadian lone mothers  These studies have generally found the
expected associations of welfare participation with personal characteristics, labour market indicators
and policy parameters.  Though informative, most survey data can not answer several questions of
key interest to policy makers.  What determines the length of time which lone mothers spend on
welfare? After leaving welfare, which lone mothers are most likely to return to the rolls and how
soon?  Is there evidence of welfare dependence, that is, a “welfare trap”?  For example, does the
likelihood that a lone mother will leave welfare decline as her spell gets longer?  Do individuals with
great SA use in the past have a greater likelihood of returning to the rolls or of a longer spell on
welfare spell if they do return?  2
Several recent  papers have used caseload data from British Columbia and Quebec to answer
some of the above questions.  We begin the task for Ontario in this paper using administrative data
made available to the authors by the Ministry of Community and Social Services (MCSS). 
Specifically, we analyse the link between the duration of spells both on welfare and off welfare, and
a series of factors including personal characteristics, the client’s history of welfare use, the duration
of the current spell, labour market conditions and SA benefit levels. 
Section II of the paper contains a brief review of the literature.  The Ontario welfare system
and the data used in this study are discussed in Section III.  Section IV presents our estimation
strategy.  The empirical estimates for welfare spells and off-welfare spells are discussed in Sections
V and VI respectively. Section VII is a summary and conclusion.
II. Review of the Literature
The Canadian literature on welfare can be divided into studies of the probability of welfare
participation  and studies of the welfare spell length.  Prior to a discussion of specific studies,
however,  a brief review of the comparative statics of welfare participation will be helpful. [See
Charette and Meng (1994) for a detailed, graphical exposition.] The two welfare policy parameters
which influence the budget set are the guarantee and the tax rate.  The guarantee or basic assistance
(BA) is the welfare payment if the client has no other source of income.  The implicit (or negative)
welfare tax is zero on some minimal level of monthly earnings referred to as the “earned income
exemption” (EIE).  The tax on earnings beyond the exemption is the “marginal tax rate” (MTR).3
The “break even” is the level of earnings at which the welfare payment is reduced to zero which, in
a simple system, is equal to EIE + (BA/MTR).  
The probability that a randomly selected individual qualifies for SA is an increasing function
of the level of basic assistance and the earnings exemption, and a decreasing function of the marginal
tax rate.  Individuals with higher hourly wages will reach the break even at fewer hours of market
work, thereby making the probability of welfare participation a decreasing function of market wages.
These predictions have generally been confirmed by Canadian studies of welfare participation [Allen
(1993), Charette and Meng (1994), Christofides, Stengos, and Swindisky (1997) and Dooley (1996)]
and in U.S. studies reviewed in Moffitt (1992).  These studies also generally find the likelihood of
welfare participation is greater for lone mothers who are poorly educated, never married, have larger
numbers of younger children and live in weak labour markets.  In this paper, we assess the impact
of many of these same variables on the length of welfare spells and off-welfare spells among SA
clients. 
Would we expect policy parameters, personal characteristics and the labour market to have
the same impact on welfare length as on the probability of welfare participation? For a random
sample of individuals, among whom the most common welfare spell length would be zero months,
the answer is yes. Our administrative sample, however, is limited to actual clients and our estimated
coefficients may be influenced by the non-random nature of selection into the data set.  For example,
one would expect  an increase in basic assistance to have two effects: (1)  lengthen the welfare spells
of those persons already on welfare and (2) increase the proportion of the overall population that ever
starts a welfare spell.  If the second effect adds persons to the rolls with welfare spells which are
shorter than those of veteran welfare clients, then the average observed spell length among all clients4
could decrease.  This same problem is true of the predicted effects of other independent variables
and of off-welfare spells.  Unambiguous predictions are difficult to make.  However, we, and other
researchers, usually find that the empirical association between independent variables and spell
length is qualitatively similar to that found in studies of welfare participation.
A key policy issue for which administrative data is well suited is that of welfare dependence
or a “welfare trap”.  Does past use of the welfare system alter the likelihood of future use?  Such
dependence might result from changes in skills (atrophy), employers’ perceptions (stigma),
knowledge of the SA system (fixed participation costs) or preferences.   The term duration
dependence refers to a situation in which the probability of terminating the spell changes as the spell
proceeds.  Lagged duration dependence refers to a situation in which the length of the current spell
varies with the length of the previous spell(s).  Detecting the presence of either type of dependence
is complicated by the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity (UH).  For example, some clients may
be “short spell” types and others “long spell” types.  As a welfare spell proceeds, the exit probability
of the surviving clients may decline either because their individual characteristics are changing (skill
atrophy) or because the surviving sample of clients consists increasingly of “long spell” types. 
There have been two in-depth studies of welfare spell duration among Canadian lone
mothers.   Barrett (1996) uses a ten percent random sample from the caseload in British Columbia
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between 1980 and 1992.  For lone mothers, he finds that welfare exit rates are negatively related to
(the spell length declines with) potential welfare benefits, the unemployment rate, and the number
of children, and are positively related to the minimum wage.  Barrett controls for one form of UH
and still finds strong evidence for both negative duration dependence (the likelihood of terminating
a spell declines as the spell gets longer) and negative lagged duration dependence (currents spells5
are longer for clients with more total months on welfare prior to the current spell).  Barrett concludes
that welfare may have scarring or stigmatizing effects for some clients.   He also finds strong
evidence of UH which implies that more information is needed in order to identify those groups
which are most vulnerable to such dependence effects.  Barrett did not analyse off-welfare spells.
Fortin, Lacroix and Thibault (1997) use a sample of single parents on welfare between 1979
and 1993 in Quebec.  One of their major concerns is the impact on welfare spells of unemployment
insurance (UI) policy as measured by the “generosity” of the unemployment insurance (defined as
the ratio of the maximum number of weeks a claimant may receive UI to the minimum number of
weeks worked needed to qualify for UI) and the rate of coverage of UI. 
They find evidence of negative duration dependence within welfare spells but, unlike Barrett,
they were unable to control for UH because these models did not converge.   (They did not test for
lagged duration dependence.)  They also found, as did Barrett, that the welfare exit rates are
negatively related to potential welfare benefits, the unemployment rate, and the number of children
(either pre-school or school-age) and positively related to parental age.   Unlike Barrett, they found
that welfare exit rates are negatively related to the provincial minimum wage.  Fortin et al. used
several variables which Barrett did not.  The exit rate decreases with the welfare tax rate and
increases with the client’s schooling and with the generosity of the UI system. They were not able
to identify the impact of UI coverage in their welfare spell model
Fortin et al. provide the only Canadian estimates of a duration model for off-welfare spells.
They find evidence of negative duration dependence, i.e., the likelihood of returning to welfare
becomes smaller the longer one has been off the rolls, but here too they were unable to control for
UH.  The hazard of returning to welfare decreases with the age of the client but only after age 30.6
 More education lengthens off-welfare spells but only for clients under 30.   Surprisingly, the exit
rate is not significantly associated with potential welfare benefits or with the number and ages of
children. The exit rate back onto welfare is positively affected by the unemployment rate and the
minimum wage and is negatively associated with the generosity and coverage of the UI system. 
In summary, Canadian studies of welfare use among lone mothers have generally found the
expected association with personal characteristics, policy parameters and labour market conditions.
In particular, duration analyses of welfare spell length have provided some evidence of dependence
(scarring or stigma) effects. 
  
III.   Social Assistance in Ontario:  The Basic System and Our Data Set
Short term financial assistance in Ontario is provided by municipalities under the terms of
the General Welfare Assistance (GWA) Act.  The provincial government administers a program of
long-term assistance under the Family Benefits Act (FBA).  GWA clients are categorized according
to “reason for assistance” such as “inability to find regular employment” or and “lack of principal
family provider”.  FBA clients are categorized according to “case classification” such as “disabled”
or “sole support parent”. Some lone mothers receive only GWA or FBA during an entire spell but
switches from GWA to FBA are common.  Indeed, a three month “waiting period” on GWA before
switching to FBA was required of most unwed, separated and deserted lone parents prior to October
1991.  In our estimation sample, 45% of spells involved a switch from GWA to FBA, only 2%
involved a switch from FBA to GWA, 40% were solely (the uncensored portion) GWA and 14%
were solely FBA. 7
 Table 1 provides basic caseload information for our sample period, 1983 through 1994. The
final column shows that the total caseload grew from 3.7% to 8.0% of the population age 15 and
over.  The total number of recipients (clients plus dependents) grew from 5.2% to 12.1% of the total
population. Most of this growth occurred from 1990 on, but it is still notable that the caseload grew
as a fraction of the population even during the strong recovery of the late 1980's when the
unemployment rate fell from 11% to 7%.   The proportion of clients who are lone parents grew from
30% to 37% during the 1980's but shrank back to 30% during the 1990's. 
Table 2 provides information concerning annual benefit levels.   In 1983, the FBA benefits
for a lone parent with two children were the same as the GWA benefits for a couple with two
children.  By 1994, the former had grown by 45% and the latter had grown by 65%.  Most of this
growth in benefit levels occurred prior to 1990.  Real benefit levels changed little during the 1990's
until the until the cuts initiated by the current government in 1995.  The final column of Table 2
shows the quadrupling of real social assistance expenditures which underlies much of the concern
with welfare policy in Ontario.
Our data set contains a record for most individuals who received welfare in Ontario for one
or more months during the period January 1983 to December 1994.  We have annual values for
demographic characteristics such as marital status and number of dependents under age 22.  We have
monthly values for welfare-specific variables such as level of welfare income and of other sources
of income, and the reason for assistance.  We have values at first encounter and at last encounter with
the social assistance system during the data period for the variables schooling and
county/municipality of residence.  Finally,  we have several unchanging variables such as date of
birth and sex.   8
There are two significant gaps in our data.  The first is that we have no GWA data for persons
in ten counties/regional municipalities/districts which account for approximately 15% of the
population of Ontario.    The second gap is that we are missing substantial amounts of data for the
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years 1983-1989.  In the case of FBA, we are missing data for ten (non-consecutive) months during
this seven year period.  For GWA, monthly data are only available for March, June, September and
December of (most of) the years during this period.  Hence, GWA data are missing for two-thirds
of the months prior to 1990.  These gaps imply that we lack complete information for many welfare
spells of either of the following types:  (1) spells which occurred in those regions for which GWA
data are not available (at any point in time) and (2) spells which commenced prior to 1990 in any part
of the province.  Therefore, we have chosen to restrict our estimating sample to those spells which
commenced after 1989 and which occurred in areas for which we have GWA data.
Welfare Spells and Off-Welfare Spells.   The estimates presented in this paper are based on
the “two-month rule” which Barrett (1996) used to define spells with the BC data.  A new welfare
spell begins only after two successive months in which no cheque is issued and ends only when one
encounters the next two successive months in which no cheque is issued.   Barrett’s rationale was
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that a non-trivial proportion of what appear to be one-month, off-welfare spells (a single month with
no cheque, preceded and followed by one or more months with a cheque) were in fact administrative
or coding errors rather than true spell terminations.  In results not presented here, we also used the
“one-month rule”adopted by Fortin, Lacroix and Thibault (1997) under which a welfare spell is any
sequence of one or more months in which a cheque is issued and an off-welfare spell is any sequence
of one or more months in which a cheque is not issued.  The two rules for spell definition yield very9
similar proportional hazard model estimates due to the fact that few lone mothers in our data have
single isolated months either on welfare or off welfare.   
4
Lone Mothers.  We classified as a lone mother any woman between the between the ages of
18 and 59 who met either demographic criteria or case classification criterion.   Our demographic
5
criteria are that the client be unmarried (registered or common-law) with one or more dependents
under the age of 22.  The case classification criteria are that the woman be either (i) an FBA client
classified as “single parent” or (ii) a GWA client who has one or more dependents under age 22 and
is classified as “lacks of principal family provider”.
6
Each of the above criteria for lone motherhood has a drawback.  The demographic criteria
may miss some de facto lone mothers may who are legally married. .  The case classification criteria
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may miss some GWA lone mothers whose category is not “lack of principal family provider” but
rather, for example, “unable to find employment”.  Therefore, we classified as a lone mother any
client who met either criteria during any month of the spell.  For the off-welfare spells, we classified
as a lone mother any client who met either criteria during any month of the preceding welfare spell.
In our sample, 89% of the spells met both criteria, 10% met only the demographic criteria, and 1%
met only the case classification criteria. 
Summary Statistics.  Our estimation sample is a 10% random sub-sample of all records that
met the criteria described in the two previous sections.  Table 3 provides descriptive statistics. The
maximum welfare spell length is 58 months.  The mean welfare spell length is 17 months (with no
adjustment for censoring) and 47% of all welfare spells are censored.  Off-welfare spells can be up
to 57 months long, they average 17 months in length and 67% are censored.   10
We constructed two measures of previous welfare use, the first of which is the number
months on welfare between 1983 and the current spell. This averaged 7 months for welfare spells
and 16 months for off-welfare spells.   The second is a dummy variable for any months on welfare
between 1983 and the current spell.  Thirty-nine per cent (39%) of our welfare spells were not a first
spell during the 1983-1994 period.  By definition, this variable had a value of 100% for off-welfare
spells.  The next three rows of Table 3 indicate that, within the 1990-1994 period,  most of our
welfare and off-welfare spells were first spells. 
Welfare clients are a bit younger than ex-clients (off-welfare spells) due in part to the fact
that one must complete a welfare spell in order to start an off-welfare spell in our sample.    We have
8
the client’s level of education at first encounter and at last encounter with the welfare system
between 1983 and 1994, but values are missing for about 25% of our sample.  We used the schooling
value at the last encounter unless it was missing in which case we used the value for education at the
first encounter if present.  As Table 3 indicates, our sample of non-missing values was about evenly
divided between those who have and have not completed high school. 
Almost one-half of the mothers had only one child and less than one-fifth had three or more.
 Just over one-half of the mothers had a preschool age child and about 20% of the lone mothers in
our sample were never married.  We classified a mother as “not employable” if her FBA “case
classification” or GWA “reason for assistance” was poor health or disability.  This monthly value
was a time-varying covariate in the welfare spell analysis.  For the off-welfare spells, we classify a
client as employable or not employable according to the last month of the most recent welfare spell.
As Table 3 shows, very few  (3-4%) clients begin either type of spell as “not employable”.  V
w
t 'V w(z(t),b(t),T w)
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Welfare benefits vary with family size and we followed Barrett in measuring this variable
on a per capita (family member) basis.  The most likely alternative to social assistance for many is
a minimum wage job.  We used the potential earnings from a full-time (140 hours per month) job
at the minimum wage.  We measured this variable on a per capita basis also in order to reflect the
typical choice set of the mothers in our data. 
Our labour market variables are the unemployment rate (for males age 20-59) and the help
wanted index both of which are available for six different regions:  Toronto, Hamilton (no
observations in our estimation sample), London, Ottawa, Sudbury and the rest of the province.  We
used all except Hamilton for which we have no GWA data.  We know the region of residence of each
client at the time of first contact and last contact with the welfare system during the sample period.
 In order to assign labour market variable values in each month, we assigned a client whichever
regional value (first or last contact) was closest in time to the month in question. 
IV. Estimation Strategy
The theoretical model underlying our estimation strategy assumes that individuals remain on
welfare if the value of that state is greater than the value of the alternative state. Processes which
could cause the relative values of these states to change over time include the arrival of a wage offer,
a potential mate or another child. 
The value of staying on welfare is defined as:V
o
t 'V o(z(t),w(t),T o)
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where z(t) is a vector of personal characteristics at time t, b(t) is the potential benefits at time t, and
T  is the length of the welfare spell.  The value of being off-welfare is defined as:
w
,
where w(t) is the value of earned income when off welfare and T  is the length of time off welfare.
o
Comparing these values and assuming that opportunities for leaving welfare arrive at some constant
rate, <, according to a Poisson process, gives the hazard rate:
     (1)
We follow Barrett and Fortin et al. in using the Prentice-Gloeckler-Meyer (PGM) piece-wise
constant proportional hazard procedure to estimate the baseline hazard function and the coefficients
for personal characteristics, policy parameters and labour market conditions [Prentice and Gloeckler
(1978), Meyer (1988), or Meyer (1990)].  The PGM procedure requires no assumptions about the
shape of the baseline hazard and allows control for one type of UH.  A limitation of the PGM
approach is that the covariates are assumed to shift the baseline but not to affect its shape. The
proportional hazard model with UH assumed to take a multiplicative gamma form is the following:
,( 2 )
where h is individual i’s hazard rate, h (t) is the baseline hazard function to be estimated, z(t) is a i0 i
vector of individual i’s characteristics which can vary through time, $ is the parameter vector to be
estimated and 2 is a random variable that is assumed to be independent of z(t) and follow a gamma i i
distribution with a mean normalized to one and a variance of F .  
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The baseline is divided into intervals and the hazard rate is assumed to be constant within
each interval.  The decision concerning the number and length of the pieces must balance a desire
for functional flexibility (more pieces) and convergence time and estimator precision (fewer pieces).13
Our choice has been guided both by the specifications of previous researchers and by our own
empirical hazard functions.  The baseline hazard is divided into nineteen intervals for welfare spells
and into fourteen intervals for off-welfare spells.  The chart below provides the final month for each
interval.  The interval length is the difference between the final months of successive intervals.  For
example, the length of the fourteenth welfare interval is 5 (=21-16) months. 
Definition of Intervals for Baseline Hazard 
I n t e r v a l 1234 5 6 7 8 91 01 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 9
F i n a l  M o n t h :   1234 5 6 7 8 91 01 11 31 62 12 73 54 55 54
Welfare
Off-Welfare 2345 6 91 01 11 21 72 73 84 94
Estimates of this model both for welfare and off-welfare spells are presented in the next two sections.
We experimented with fewer intervals and found that the coefficient estimates for the other
independent variables changed little.  See Stewart (1998) for further details concerning the
estimation procedure. 
V. Welfare Spells
The Kaplan-Meier empirical hazard function and survival function for the welfare spells are
presented in Figures 1 and 2 respectively.  The empirical hazard function is the ratio of exits to the
number of spells still ongoing for each month defined as: 
h(t) = d/n. tt14
where n is the number of spells still ongoing at time t and d is the number of exits at time t.  The t t
survivor function is the percentage of spells still ongoing at each month defined as: 
S(t) = (  ((n - d)/n) j | j<t j j j
The hazard rate in Figure 1 falls off sharply during the first ten months of the spell and declines very
slowly or not at all thereafter.  Figure 2 reveals considerable variation in spell length.  Approximately
30% of the spells end within 5 months and 50% of the spells are over within 20 months.  More than
30%, however, are still ongoing at 55 months. 
The estimates of the proportional hazard models for welfare spells are presented in Figure
3 and Table 4.  We present the estimates for four different specifications:  with and without the
mother’s level of education, and with and without controls for UH.   Education is missing for over
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one-quarter of the observations and inclusion of this variable reduces our sample size from 20,139
to 14,918.  As a check, we also estimated the hazard function using the education sample but
omitting the schooling variables from the model.  The resulting estimates (not shown here) are very
similar to those presented in Figure 3 and Table 4.  A likelihood ratio test (also not shown here)
rejects the null hypothesis of no heterogeneity for both specifications (with and without schooling)
with p-values of less than .01.
The baseline hazard is graphed in Figure 3.   Tables of the coefficient and standard error
estimates are available upon request from the authors.   For Figure 3, we assigned the following
modal values to the independent binary variables and mean values to the independent continuous
variables. The spell is the first one (in 1990-1994) and it occurs in the 4  quarter for a mother aged
th
32 who is previously married, employable, with no previous welfare use, grade 12-13 schooling and15
one dependent child, age 6-21.  The unemployment rate is 9.0, the help-wanted index is 110, the
benefit level is 460, and the minimum wage earnings is 316. 
The shape of the baseline hazard provides a test of duration dependence within the spell.  We
conducted Wald tests for equality of the various steps in each baseline hazard.  The tests indicate the
presence of negative duration dependence throughout the first year of the spell in the following three
cases:  both specifications without education and the specification with education but no controls
for UH.   When we control for schooling and UH, there is support for negative duration dependence
but only between the fourth and ninth months of the spell. We are unable to reject the hypothesis of
no difference between the steps in the first and third months and between the hazard steps in the
ninth and fourteenth months.  In Figure 3, there is some evidence of an increasing hazard (positive
duration dependence) beyond the first year especially when we control for education and UH. 
However, when we conducted step by step comparisons of the baseline after the ninth month, we
were unable to reject of hypothesis of no difference.  This result was even true of the sharp increase
in the baseline hazard at the last step, i.e., we were unable to reject the null hypothesis that the last
two steps are equal due to the large standard errors.  In sum, we find support for negative duration
dependence in the first twelve months as have others, but this support is weakest in our preferred
specification with controls for both client schooling and unobserved heterogeneity. 
The remaining hazard coefficients for the welfare spells are in Table 4.  Each coefficient
indicates the proportional shift in the baseline hazard predicted by the indicated change in the
independent variable.  Hence, a coefficient of 1.10 represents a ten percent shift up in the hazard
(shorter spell) and a coefficient of 0.90 represents a ten percent shift down (longer spell).  It may be
easier to think in terms of spell length.  The baseline hazard in Figure 3 with controls for both16
schooling and UH implies a mean spell length of 9 months if one assumes a constant hazard beyond
the sample period.   A ten percent shift up (down) in the hazard implies a mean spell length of 8
10
(10) months.  A fifty percent shift up (down) in the hazard implies a mean spell length of 5 (17)
months.   Most of the variables have significant coefficients of the sign that would be predicted
by a simple model of welfare participation.  Older lone mothers have higher hazards (shorter spells).
A schooling level of Grade 9 or less is strongly associated with longer spells but this educational
category characterizes a small and rapidly diminishing proportion of the population especially
younger adults (Dooley 1996).  Post-secondary education is associated with shorter spells.  A joint
test (not shown here) of the hypothesis that all of the schooling coefficients are equal to zero rejects
the null with a p-value of less than .01.  The status of never-married is strongly associated with
longer welfare spells, a result consistent with all previous studies cited in Section II.   The specific
interpretation of this finding is obvious, but this characteristic is clearly not just a proxy for youth
and poor schooling.   More children are associated with longer welfare spells which is consistent
with the heavier home responsibilities.  Furthermore, welfare is worth more to larger families in the
sense that benefits vary with family size but market wages do not.  Note, however, that we adjust
both our welfare benefit and minimum wage earnings measures for family size.  The presence of pre-
school children is associated with longer spells.  The BC data available to Barrett did not contain the
age of children.  The measures used by Fortin, Lacroix and Thibault with the Quebec data were the
number of children under 6 and the number of children age 6-17.  Both effects were significantly
negative (longer spells for younger children) and, consistent with our results, the coefficient for the
number of preschool children was much larger than that for school age children.  We can not
replicate their model exactly because we only know the age of the youngest child.   Few lone mothers17
are classified as non-employable in our data, but those that are have a much lower hazard than do
the employable ones      Higher welfare benefits are strongly associated with a lower hazard.
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These estimates imply that an increase of $100 per month per family member (about a 25% increase
at the mean) implies an increase in the mean predicted spell length from 9 months to 14 months. The
expected effect of an increase in minimum wage earnings is ambiguous for well known reasons.
Higher wages, if available, make market work more attractive but the effect of a legislated increase
may be to limit job opportunities for welfare clients.  Our estimates in Table 4 indicate a positive
impact (shorter spell) of minimum wage earnings on the hazard rate.  As expected, a higher
unemployment rate is associated with a lower hazard rate and longer welfare spells.  The coefficients
for the help-wanted index are not significantly different from zero. 
The coefficient for previous months on welfare is highly significant which indicates the
presence of lagged negative duration dependence.   However, the magnitude of the coefficient is
small.  An additional ten previous months on welfare increases the expected length of the current
spell  by less than half a month.   The interactions coefficients imply that this lagged duration effect
does not vary with the age of the client. We also include two dummy variables which indicate if the
spell is the second or third (or higher order) spell within the sample period.  We find, as did Barrett,
that both coefficients are significantly positive.  Our sample period is less than five years long and,
as a result, average spell length must be relatively short for there to be multiple spells.
Our quarterly dummy variables confirm that the hazard rate is distinctly higher in the second
and third quarters than in the fourth quarter.  The evidence also indicates that the first quarter hazard
is higher than the last quarter hazard.  The next-to-last row of Table 5 provides an estimate of the
variance in the unobserved determinant of the welfare hazard.  The coefficients in columns (2) and18
(4) are both significantly different from zero which indicates rejection the hypothesis of no UH as
did the likelihood ratio tests cited earlier in this section. 
VI.   Off-Welfare Spells
The empirical hazard and survival functions for the off-welfare spells are presented in
Figures 4 and 5 respectively.   The empirical hazard falls off sharply during the first ten months of
the spell and thereafter declines very slowly or not at all. The survival function reveals that
approximately 25% of ex-clients return to welfare within the first 10 months.  Beyond that point, the
survival function becomes relatively flat and about 60% of ex-clients are still off welfare after 4
years. 
The estimates of the proportional hazard models for off-welfare spells are presented in Figure
6 and Table 5.  We report results for only the two specifications that do not control for UH.  The log-
likelihood function is a function of the variance of the UH and constraining the value of this variance
to be positive results in the log-likelihood being maximized at zero.  This result indicates that UH
is not present in our sample of off-welfare spells. 
The baseline hazard in Figure 6 uses the same values for the independent variables that were
used for the welfare baseline hazard with one exception.  Previous months on welfare is now set
equal to the sample mean of 14.  Our Wald tests of the baseline in both off-welfare specifications
indicate the presence of negative duration dependence during most of the first year of the spell but
not beyond that point.  Staying off welfare during the first twelve months appears to lead to a lower
likelihood of recidivism 19
The remaining proportional hazard coefficients are in Table 5.  The baseline hazard with
controls for both schooling implies a mean off-welfare spell length of 32 months if one assumes a
constant hazard beyond the sample period.    A ten percent shift up (down) in the hazard implies a
12
mean spell length of 30 (34) months.  A fifty percent shift up (down) in the hazard implies a mean
spell length of 25 (46) months.  
Older lone mothers consistently have lower hazards (longer spells).  None of the schooling
variables have significant coefficients and, furthermore, a joint test of the hypothesis that all of the
schooling coefficients are equal to zero fails to reject the null (p-value = .75).  Never-married lone
mothers are more likely to return to welfare (higher hazard) which is consistent with our findings
from the previous section and the literature in general.  
 Our expectation was that a larger number of children would be associated with a higher
likelihood of returning to welfare, but the estimated coefficient implies just the opposite.  (Fortin et
al. estimated coefficients for the number of children under 6 and the number of children age 6-17,
neither of which were significantly different from zero.)  One possible explanation for this finding
is selection bias, i.e., those mothers with large families who do manage to leave welfare are a highly
selective subset of all clients and possess (unobserved) characteristics that make a return to social
assistance very unlikely.  This hypothesis is, unfortunately, not testable with currently available data.
Another possible explanation for the family size coefficients arises from the possibility that
the birth of an additional child may prompt a return to welfare in some cases because this raises the
value of home-time and lowers the net value of market work due to child care costs.  And such
additional births while off-welfare may be more likely among those ex-clients who have relatively20
few children and, therefore, less incentive to limit family size which would be consistent with our
coefficient estimate.
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The presence of a child under age 2 is strongly associated with a higher probability of a return
to welfare but the presence of a child age 2-5 is not.  This difference in age-of-child effects was also
found for welfare spells.  Mothers who are classified as non-employable due to poor health or
disability have a higher likelihood of a return to social assistance. 
The coefficients for welfare benefits imply, as expected, that higher benefit levels make a
return to social assistance more likely.  As with welfare spells, the size of this effect is quite large.
An increase of $100 in per capita welfare benefits (about 25%) would lead to a decrease in the
predicted mean spell length from 32 months to 16 months.  Higher minimum wages are associated
with longer off-welfare spells which is consistent with the finding in Table 4 that higher minimum
wages lead to shorter welfare spells.   Higher levels of unemployment, as expected, are associated
with a faster return to welfare but the coefficients are not significant.  The coefficients for the help-
wanted index are statistically significant but have the unexpected effect of making a return to welfare
more likely.  We have no ready explanation for this finding.
  The linear coefficients for the number of previous months on welfare have a positive sign as
which is consistent with our finding of negative lagged duration dependence for welfare spells (more
previous months means a faster return to welfare) .  The p-values for the linear term are large, but
the coefficients for the interaction with age are significant.  This implies that positive lagged duration
dependence (more past use means a quicker return to welfare) may characterize the lone mothers
who are older  have terminated spells.  However, even among lone mothers age 42, who represent
less than 10% of our sample, the effect of another 10 months of previous welfare is to shift up the21
hazard by only 6%.   Lagged duration dependence does not appear to be important quantitatively in
the case of off-welfare spells.  The significantly, positive coefficients for the higher order (2nd, 3
rd
or higher) spells imply that persons who have had multiple spells are more likely to return to welfare
than are  persons who have had only one spell.  This result is consistent with our findings in the
previous section in that persons who have manage to have more than one spell within a five year
time period are likely to be persons who have frequent short welfare spells.  Finally, our quarterly
dummy variables confirm that a return to welfare is more likely in the third quarter.  This quarter was
also one in which an exit from welfare was most likely. 
VII.  Summary and Conclusion
  This paper provides a first look at the dynamics of social assistance use among lone mothers
in Ontario. We use an administrative data set provided by the Ontario Ministry of Community and
Social Services to analyse the relationship between the duration of spells, both on welfare and off
welfare, and a series of factors including the clients’ personal characteristics, their history of welfare
use, the duration of current spells, labour market conditions and social assistance benefit levels. 
The empirical hazard and survival functions reveal considerable variation in the length of
welfare spells.  Approximately 30% of the spells end within 5 months and 50% of the spells are over
within 20 months.  However, over 30% are still ongoing at 55 months.  Our proportional hazard
estimates strongly confirm the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in welfare spells.  Three of the
four specifications which we estimate also indicate the presence of negative duration dependence
(the likelihood of leaving welfare falls as the spell proceeds) during the first year of the spell.  The22
support for this finding, however, is weakest in our preferred specification.  Our results also confirm
the existence of negative lagged duration dependence, that is, the current spell is longer for lone
mothers with more months of welfare receipt in previous spells.  However, the magnitude of this
effect is quite small.   
Most of the other welfare spell coefficients have significant effects of the expected sign.
Welfare spells tend to be longer for those lone mothers who are younger, poorly educated, never
married, not employable and for those who have larger numbers of pre-school children.  Spell
lengths also increase with the level of potential welfare benefits and the unemployment rate, and to
decrease with the level of the minimum wage.   The magnitude of most of the effects are sizable
especially in the case of welfare benefits, schooling, marital status and family size. 
The empirical survival functions for off-welfare spells reveal that 25% of ex-clients return
to welfare within the first 10 months.  The survival function becomes relatively flat beyond that
point, however, and about 60% of ex-clients are still off welfare after 4 years. Our proportional
hazard estimates reveal that there is no strong evidence of unobserved heterogeneity in the case of
off-welfare spells.  There is support for the presence of negative duration dependence (the likelihood
of returning to welfare declines as the spell proceeds) during the first year.  There is some evidence
of positive lagged duration dependence (more months of welfare receipt in previous spells means
a faster return to welfare) but only among older lone mothers and the size of the effect is again quite
small. 
Off-welfare spells tend to be shorter (the return to welfare more rapid) for those lone mothers
who are older, never married, not employable and who have very young children.  Higher welfare
benefits also appear to hasten the return to welfare.  Off-welfare spells are longer when the minimum23
wage is higher.  We also find that the return to welfare is more likely when a mother has a smaller
number of children.  This last and unexpected result may be due to the selective nature of our
sample, but this finding clearly calls for more investigation. 
What are the most important policy implications of our findings?  We find mixed evidence
concerning the key question of the scarring or stigmatizing effects of welfare, that is, for a “welfare
trap”.   There is evidence that the likelihood of exiting welfare declines during the first year of a
spell.  The support is weakest, however, in our preferred specification.  There is more consistent
evidence that the likelihood of returning to welfare declines during the first year after an exit, that
is, staying off the rolls has the beneficial effect of making recidivism less likely.  Clients who have
spent more months on welfare in the past (controlling for age) do appear to have somewhat longer
future spells on welfare and to return more quickly to the rolls once they leave, but the magnitude
of this effect is very small.  Finally, the length of both welfare and off-welfare spells is very sensitive
to the levels of welfare benefits. 
Our results indicate the need for further work in the following areas.  (1) Additional
parameters should be incorporated into our analysis including measures of the coverage and
adequacy of the (un)employment insurance system and of aggregate labour demand.  (2)
Consideration should be given to  alternative measures of welfare dependency such as the proportion
of a fixed window of time that is spent on welfare which reflects both the likelihood of starting a
spell and the spell length.  This measure would also permit the use of our data for the 1983-1989
period.  (3) We need to analyse the spell duration of other groups such as young singles and couples.
(4) A competing hazard model would help us to distinguish among different reasons for leaving24
welfare and possibly provide insight into the unobserved heterogeneity which our study has
confirmed. 25
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Endnotes27
5.  We also excluded lone mothers who receive only supplementary aid, special assistance, or aid
for a foster or handicapped child.  Also, henceforth we will use the term “case classification”
when referring to both FBA and GWA categories even though “reason for assistance” is the term
officially used for the latter. 
6.  One must have a dependent under age 22 to be classified as an FBA “sole support parent”. 
Such is not the case with a GWA client who “lacks a principal family provider”.  Hence, we
added the criterion of “has one or more dependents under age 22" for the latter.
7.  See Dooley (1996) for a discussion of this issue in the context of the Survey of Consumer
Finances. 
8.  We describe the frequencies in Table 3 as though they refer to clients but they actually refer to
spells. The former are easier to discuss and the two sets of frequencies are very similar. 
9.  In one other specification, we included a dummy variable if the month was after October 1991 
when the second part of the Steps To Employment Program was introduced.  This decreased the
welfare tax rate and allowed the full amount of child care to be deducted from gross income in
the calculation of benefits.  The coefficient for this variable was not significant and there was
little change in the other estimates.  Too few off-welfare spells ended before October 1991 for
this coefficient to be identified in the off-welfare spell hazards. 
10.  Note that this predicted mean of 9 months is considerably shorter than the mean of 17
months among all observed spells, including censored ones, in Table 3.  The reason for this
difference is that we have assumed the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, as is justified by
the data, and have assigned a value for the unobserved factor that results in relatively short
predicted spells. 
11.  Some provinces classify lone parents with very young children as “unemployable” and this
was true of Barrett’s study with BC data.
12.  This predicted mean of 32 months is considerably longer than the mean of 17 months among
all observed spells in Table 3.  This difference is just as one would expect, that is, the observed
mean to be shorter because it includes censored spells.  We have not assumed the presence of
unobserved heterogeneity for off-welfare because the data do not support this assumption. 
13.  Of the lone mothers whom we observe to return to welfare, 7% have more children upon
return than at the end of their previous spell.  Of that 7%, 79% had 1-2 children at the end of
their previous spell.  Unfortunately, we lack the data to make the appropriate comparisons
because we do not know the (post-welfare) fertility history of those mothers with censored off-
welfare spells.28
Table 1
Ontario Assistance Caseload:  December, 1983-1994  
Year Family General Single Lone Other Total Total  Cases/
Benefits Assistance Persons Parents Families Cases Population, Age 15+
Number of Cases
1983 137,099 113,282 135,846 76,640 37,895 250,381 3.7%
1984 146,798 110,859 140,962 79,034 37,661 257,657 3.7%
1985 152,356 112,738 143,777 81,859 35,775 261,411 3.7%
1986 159,348 114,186 149,955 90,975 32,604 273,534 3.8%
1987 168,659 112,342 151,909 97,927 31,165 281,001 3.9%
1988 180,498 118,229 155,598 105,167 37,962 298,727 4.1%
1989 196,522 128,588 164,963 119,021 41,126 325,110 4.3%
1990 225,582 192,499 214,870 147,609 55,601 418,081 5.5%
1991 271,333 292,898 295,424 185,361 83,446 564,231 7.3%
1992 299,315 337,801 326,427 211,850 98,794 637,116 8.0%
1993 317,112 358,800 na 197,011 na 675,912 8.4%
1994 327,106 332,800 na 198,571 na 659,906 8.0%
Distribution of Cases  Total Recipients/
Total Population
1983 55 45 54 31 15 100 5.2%
1984 58 42 55 31 14 100 5.2%
1985 58 42 55 31 14 100 5.1%
1986 58 42 55 33 12 100 5.3%
1987 60 40 54 35 11 100 5.4%
1988 60 40 52 35 13 100 6.1%
1989 60 40 50 37 13 100 6.2%
1990 54 46 52 35 13 100 7.8%
1991 48 52 52 33 15 100 10.5%
1992 47 53 51 33 16 100 11.8%
1993 47 53 na 29 na 100 12.4%
1994 50 50 na 30 na 100 12.1%
Source: Inventory of Income Security Programs in Canada, Health and Welfare Canada29
Table 2
Ontario Social Assistance Benefit Levels and Total Expenditures:   1983-1994 
($1990)
Year  Annual Benefit Level  Total Expenditures
One Parent  Two Parents  (millions)
With 2 Children With 2 Children
1983 10,932 10,851 1,365
1984 11,761 11,792 1,567
1985 12,101 12,137 1,677
1986 12,735 13,719 1,770
1987 13,552 14,383 1,888
1988 13,778 15,216 2,113
1989 13,850 15,102 2,279
1990 15,193 17,791 2,609
1991 15,553 18,201 3,386
1992 15,839 18,150 4,752
1993 15,821 18,112 5,637
1994 15,828 17,952 6,055
*Sources.   Benefit levels from The Ontario Gazette-Regulations.  Expenditures from Public
Accounts of Ontario as cited in Sabatini (1996).30
Table 3
Summary Statistics for Welfare Spells and Off-Welfare Spells: 1990-1994 
First Month of  First Month of 
Welfare Spell Off-Welfare Spell
Mean Spell Length (months with censored spells) 17 17
% of Spells Censored 47% 67%
Months of Previous Welfare Use Since 1983 71 6
Any Prior Welfare Use Since 1983 39% 100%
1st Spell in Sample Period 77% 80%
2nd Spell in Sample Period 17% 16%
3rd or Higher Spell in Sample Period  5% 4%





Education (frequency of non-missing values in
parentheses) 
Less than Grade 10 11% (15%) 11% (15%)
Grade 10 or 11 24% (33%) 25% (33%)
Grade 12 or 13 27% (36%) 26% (35%)
Some Post Secondary 12% (16%) 13% (17%)
Missing Values for Education 26% 25%
One Child Under Age 22 48% 47%
Two Children 34% 35%
3 or More Children 18% 18%
Age of Youngest Child <2 28% 17%31
Table 3 (continued)
Age of Youngest Child 2-5 31% 35%
Age of Youngest (Dependent) Child 6-21 41% 48%
Never Married 23% 20%
Not Employable (Disabled) 4% 3%
Maximum Monthly Welfare Benefits/Family
Size(1990$)
461 462
Minimum Wage Earnings/Family Size
(140 hours per month)
304 310
Unemployment Rate 8.8% 9.1%
Help Wanted Index 112 105
Sample Size 20139 1073232
Table 4
Duration Model Estimates on Welfare Spells
Variables Without Education With Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No Heter. Heterog. No Heter. Heterog.
Age/10 1.114* 1.171* 1.112* 1.198*
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Education: Less than Grade 10 --- --- 0.931* 0.879*
(.02) (.00)
Grade 10 or 11 --- --- 0.991 1.011
(.38) (.39)
Some Post Secondary --- --- 1.099* 1.107*
(.00) (.02)
Never Married 0.746* 0.701* 0.786* 0.731*
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Two Children 0.810* 0.662* 0.749* 0.544*
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Three or More Children 0.670* 0.474* 0.610* 0.362*
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Youngest Child Under 2 0.875* 0.861* 0.858* 0.825*
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Youngest Child 2 to 5 0.973 0.962 0.959 0.938
(.14) (.00) (.25) (.06)
Not Employable
(Health/Disability)
0.681* 0.656* 0.690* 0.648*
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Potential Benefits/Family Size
($00)
0.593* 0.542* 0.656* 0.584*
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Minimum Wage Earnings/Family
Size ($00)
1.518* 1.449* 1.295* 1.179
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.05)
Unemployment Rate 0.956* 0.949* 0.953* 0.948*
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)33
Table 4 (continued)
Help-Wanted Index /10 1.001 1.006 0.995 0.999
(.44) (.25) (.25) (.46)
Number of Past Months on
Welfare /10
0.978* 0.972* 0.980* 0.967*
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.01)
(Age/10) * (Number of Past
Months of Welfare/10)
0.993 0.997 1.003 1.001
(.47) (.39) (.39) (.49)
Second Spell 1.129* 1.158* 1.082* 1.082
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.03)
Third or More Spell 1.255* 1.362* 1.191* 1.303*
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
First Quarter 1.082* 1.093* 1.058 1.063
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.468)
Second Quarter 1.152* 1.149* 1.153* 1.145*
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Third Quarter 1.159* 1.158* 1.139* 1.138*
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Sigma (Gamma Heterogeneity) --- 0.787 --- 1.173
(.00) (.00)
Sample Size 20139 20139 14918 14918
*The baseline hazard was estimated for a spell which is the first one (in 1990-1994) that
occurs in the 4  quarter for a mother aged 32 who is previously married, employable, with no
th
previous welfare use, grade 12-13 schooling and one dependent child age 6-21.  The
unemployment rate is 9.0, the help-wanted index is 110, the benefit level is 460, and
minimum wage earnings are 316.
**Dummy variables were included for five regions, but the results are not reported here.
***Values in the parenthesis are p-values.  Asterisks indicate that the coefficient is
significantly different from one at a 5% confidence level.34
Table 5
Duration Model Estimates Off-Welfare Spell:  No Unobserved Heterogeneity 
Variables Without Education With Education
Age/10 0.845* 0.864*
(.00) (.00)
Education: Less than Grade 10 --- 1.009
(.448)
Grade 10 or 11 --- 0.981
(.34)
Some Post Secondary --- 1.056
(.17)
Never Married 1.150* 1.205*
(.00) (.00)
Two Children 0.634* 0.709*
(.00) (.00)
Three or More Children 0.500* 0.625*
(.00) (.00)
Youngest Child Under 2 1.557* 1.484*
(.00) (.00)
Youngest Child 2 to 5 0.995 1.006
(.46) (.046)
Not Employable (Health/Disability) 1.701* 1.826*
(.00) (.157)
Potential Benefits/Family Size ($100) 2.597* 2.681* 
(.00) (.00)
Minimum Wage Earnings/Family Size ($100) 0.270* 0.289*
(.00) (.041)
Unemployment Rate 1.010 1.015
(.30) (.23)
Help-Wanted Index /10 1.089* 1.080*
(.00) (.00)35
Table 5 (continued)
Number of Past Months on Welfare /10 1.017 1.015
(.08) (.15)




Second Spell 1.575* 1.431*
(.00) (.00)
Third or More Spell 1.867* 1.573*
(.00) (.00)
First Quarter 0.954 0.932
(.19) (.12)
Second Quarter 1.060 1.037
(.11) (.25)
Third Quarter 1.106* 1.144*
(.02) (.00)
Sample Size 10732 8081
*The baseline hazard was estimated for a spell which is the first one (in 1990-1994) that
occurs in the 4  quarter for a mother aged 32 who is previously married, employable, with 14
th
months of previous welfare use, grade 12-13 schooling and one dependent child age 6-21.  The
unemployment rate is 9.0, the help-wanted index is 110, the benefit level is 460, and minimum
wage earnings are 316. 
**Dummy variables were included for the regions, but the results are not reported here.
***Values in the parenthesis are p-values.  Asterisks indicate that coefficient is significantly






Fig. 1 Empirical Hazard Function for On Welfare Spells
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Fig 2. Survival Function for On Welfare Spells
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Fig 4. Empirical Hazard Function for Off Welfare Sp
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Fig.3 Baseline Hazards for On Welfare Spells
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Fig.6 Baseline Hazard for Off Welfare Spells
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Fig 5. Survival Function for Off Welfare Spells
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